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Abstract—Electronic health systems, such as Telecare Medical
Information System (TMIS), allow patients to exchange their
health information with a medical center/doctor for diagnosis in
real-time, and across borders. Given the sensitive nature of health
information/medical data, ensuring the security of such systems
is crucial. In this paper, we revisit Das et al.’s authentication
protocol, which is designed to ensure patient anonymity and
untraceability. Then, we demonstrate that the security claims
are invalid, by showing how both security features can be
compromised. We also demonstrate that the protocol suffers from
new smartcard launch attacks. To mitigate such design flaws,
we propose a new lightweight authentication protocol using the
cryptographic hash function for TMIS. We then analyze the
security of the proposed protocol using AVISPA and Scyther,
two widely used formal specification tools. The performance
analysis demonstrates that our protocol is more efficient than
other competing protocols.
Index Terms—AVISPA; Multi-Medical system; Authentication;
Anonymity; Telecare Medical Information System; Scyther.
I. INTRODUCTION
AN efficient electronic health system can facilitate orinform medical decision-making based on accurate and
up-to-date information, such as the most up-to-date health
/ medical condition of the patient. It can be challenging
to make a medical diagnosis for a new patient since the
medical practitioner does not access to the patient’s prior
medical history and other relevant information in real-time,
since this is the first time that this medical practitioner is
seeing the patient. This limitation can be mitigated in an
electronic health system, since the medical practitioner from a
participating healthcare institution can obtain real-time access
to the patient’s medical history and other relevant information
stored in the server of another healthcare institution. Clearly,
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ensuring data confidentiality, integrity, and privacy is crucial
in such systems. However, requirements may vary between
different electronic health systems, for example due to the
privacy legislation in the jurisdiction where the systems are
hosted. Examples of electronic health systems include the
following [1]:
• Electronic Health Record (ERH) system is designed to
maintain patient records, and facilitate e-prescribing, clin-
ical administration, e-booking and digital imaging, and
archiving systems.
• Telemedicine and telehealth systems allow the dissemina-
tion and storage of health and other medical data over the
Internet to facilitate medical diagnosis and other medical
services; thus, improving patient access and optimizing
use of digital health assets.
• Clinical health IT systems include radiology, nursing
systems, computer-assisted diagnostics, medical imaging,
and surgery training and planning systems. Such systems
facilitate physicians in providing more accurate diagnoses
and treatments to patients.
• Online health IT systems include online health portals,
which can be accessed by patients to obtain information
about health related services (e.g. book an appointment
and check on the reports of one’s recent laboratory tests).
• Specialized electronic health systems include those used
by researchers for public health data collection and
analysis, such as bio-statistical programs for infectious
diseases, drug development, and outcomes analysis.
In a Telecare Medical Information System (TMIS), patient
anonymity is crucial and violation of patient privacy can have
serious legal ramifications. Hence, cryptographic techniques
are generally used to protect patient anonymity and data
privacy [4], [5], [6], [3], [7], [8], [9], [2], [14], [17]. In 2015,
for example, Amin and Biswas [17] proposed a conceptual
architecture for the distributed medical system, where any
registered patient can directly exchange medical data with par-
ticipating medical practitioner(s). The authors also proposed a
hash function based authentication protocol using smartcard.
They claimed that their protocol is efficient and secure against
several security threats. Das et al. [18], however, revealed a
number of security weaknesses in Amin and Biswas’s proto-
col [17] and presented an improved protocol. Independently,
Lin et al. [19] also noted that the protocol of Amin and
Biswas is insecure against off-line password guessing attack,
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2insider attack and impersonation attack. In 2017, Liu et al.
[20] also presented several security weaknesses of Das et al.’s
[18] protocol as well as an improved protocol.
In the next section, we will revisit the protocol of Das
et al. [18] before demonstrating in Section III that it is not
capable of ensuring anonymity, as well as being insecure
against traceability attack, and other smartcard related attacks.
Hence, we propose an efficient authentication protocol that
can be deployed in environment such as the TIMS architecture
proposed by Amin and Biswas [17] – see Section IV. The se-
curity and performance analysis of our protocol are presented
in Sections V and VI, respectively. We conclude the paper in
Section VII.
II. REVISITING DAS ET AL.’S PROTOCOL
The protocol of Das et al. [18] consists of the follow-
ing phases: (i) Medical-server registration phase, (ii) patient
registration phase, (iii) login phase, (iv) authentication and
session key agreement phase, (v) password and biometric
update phase, and (vi) dynamic medical-server addition phase
– see Sections II-A to II-D.
A. Medical-server Registration Phase
The medical-server MSj (1 ≤ j ≤ m) selects an identity
IDmj , and sends it to the central medical registration server
MRS. Upon receiving the request, MRS calculates a secret
key Xmj = h(IDmj ‖ Xc) for MSj , where Xc denotes the
secret key of MRS. Then, MRS sends Xmj to MSj securely.
Note that MSj keeps 〈IDmj , Xmj〉 in the database. For m′
additional medical servers MSj (m′ + 1 ≤ j ≤ m + m′),
MRS selects an unique identity IDamj , calculates Xamj =
h(IDamj ‖ Xc), and stores 〈IDamj , Xc〉 in the memory for
all additional medical servers MSj . These information will be
used ensure scalability, if needed.
B. Patient Registration Phase
In this phase, the following operations/steps are undertaken.
Step 1. The patient Up enters IDp (identity), PWp (password),
and Bp (biometric) at the sensor device. Up creates a random
number Kp and computes RPWp = h(IDp ‖ Kp ‖ PWp).
Further, Up utilizes the fuzzy extractor [27], [28] to calculate
Gen(Bp) = (σp, τu). Now, Up sends 〈IDp, RPWp〉 to MRS
via a secure network.
Step 2. On receiving 〈IDp, RPWp〉, MRS calculates Amj =
h(IDp ‖ Xmj)⊕ RPWp, Pmj = h(IDmj ‖ Xmj)⊕ RPWp
for all (1 ≤ j ≤ m+m′). Now, MRS issues a new smartcard
and writes 〈IDmj , Amj , Pmj , h(·), Gen(·), Rep(·), t〉 into the
memory of the smartcard, where 1 ≤ j ≤ m + m′ and t
denotes error-tolerance threshold value for fuzzy extractor.
Step 3. On getting the smartcard, Up computes Ep = h(IDp ‖
σp)⊕Kp and Fp = h(IDp ‖ RPWp ‖ σp). Finally, Up inserts
Ep and Fp into the smartcard.
C. Login Phase
This phase is executed to login to any of the participating
medical servers, including those belonging to other healthcare
institutions. All operations performed in this phase are given
below.
Step 1. Up inserts the smartcard into the smartcard-reader
and enters IDp, PWp and Bp. Now, the smartcard calculates
σ∗p = Rep(Bp, τp) [27], [28], K
∗
p = h(IDp ‖ σ∗p) ⊕ Ep,
RPW ∗p = h(IDp ‖ K∗p ‖ PWp), F ∗p = h(IDp ‖ RPW ∗p ‖
σ∗p) and checks whether F
∗
p =?Fp. If F
∗
p 6= Fp, then the smart-
card aborts the session, otherwise the inputted information is
considered to be correct.
Step 2. The smartcard now creates a random number Rp and
timestamp TSp, then computes MG1 = Amj ⊕ RPW ∗p =
h(IDp ‖ Xmj), MG2 = Pmj ⊕ RPW ∗p = h(IDmj ‖ Xmj),
MG3 = IDp ⊕ MG2, MG4 = IDp ⊕ MG1 ⊕ Rp and
MG5 = h(MG1 ‖ MG3 ‖ MG4 ‖ Rp ‖ TSp). Now,
the smartcard sends 〈IDmj , IDpk,MG3,MG4,MG5, TSp〉
as login message to MSj via any unreliable network.
D. Authentication and Session Key Agreement Phase
This phase authenticates the involved entities and negotiates
a common session key for secure information exchange.
Step 1. On receiving the login message
〈IDmj , IDpk,MG3,MG4,MG5, TSp〉 at time TSmj ,
MSj determines the timestamp’s validity by verifying
whether |TSmj − TSp| ≤ 4T holds, where 4T denotes
expected transmission delay. If the above condition is correct,
then MSj executes the next step, otherwise terminates the
session.
Step 2. MSj calculates MG6 = h(IDmj ‖ Xmj), MG7 =
MG3 ⊕ MG6 = IDp, MG8 = h(IDp ‖ Xmj), MG9 =
MG4 ⊕MG7 ⊕MG8 = Rp, MG10 = h(MG8 ‖ MG3 ‖
MG4 ‖ MG9 ‖ TSp). MSj now verifies whether MG10 =
?MG5. If MG10 6= MG5, then MSj aborts the session,
otherwise authenticates the Up. Note that, Das et al.’s protocol
follows the same technique used in protocol [29] to mitigate
replay and man-in-the-middle attacks.
Step 3. MSj creates a random number Rmj and times-
tamp TSms, and then calculates MG11 = h(IDmj ‖
IDpk ‖ Xmk), MG12 = IDp ⊕ MG11, MG13 =
h(IDp ‖ Xmk) ⊕ Rmj , MG14 = IDp ⊕ MG9 ⊕ Rmj ,
MG15 = h(IDp ‖ MG11 ‖ MG12 ‖ MG13 ‖ MG14 ‖
MG9 ‖ Rmj ‖ TSms). MSj sends a request message
〈IDmj , IDpk,MG12,MG13,MG14,MG15, TSms〉 to PSk
over any unreliable network.
Step 4. On receiving 〈IDmj , IDpk, MG12, MG13, MG14,
MG15, TSms〉, PSk first checks whether |TSmk − TSms| ≤
4T holds. If the condition is correct, then PSk proceeds with
further operation, otherwise terminates the current session.
PSk computes MG16 = h(IDmj ‖ IDmk ‖ Xmk), MG17 =
MG12 ⊕ MG16 = IDp, MG18 = MG13 ⊕ h(MG17 ‖
Xmk) = Rmj , MG19 = MG14 ⊕ MG17 ⊕ MG18 = Rp,
MG20 = h(MG17 ‖ MG16 ‖ MG12 ‖ MG13 ‖ MG14 ‖
MG19 ‖MG18 ‖ TSms). PSk now checks whether MG20 =
MG15 holds. If MG20 6= MG15, then PSk terminates the
3session, otherwise determines that both Up and MSj are
authentic entities.
Step 5. PSk creates random number Rmk, chooses the
current timestamp TSk, and computes MG21 = h(MG17 ‖
Xmk) = h(IDp ‖ Xmk), MG22 = MG17 ⊕MG19 ⊕ Rmk,
MG23 = MG21 ⊕ Rmk, SKUp,PSk = h(MG17 ‖ IDpk ‖
MG19 ‖ Rmk ‖ MG21 ‖ TSk), MG24 = h(SKUp,PSk ‖
MG22 ‖ MG23 ‖ MG19 ‖ Rmk ‖ TSk). Now, PSk sends
〈IDmk,MG22,MG23,MG24, TSk〉 to Up via any unreliable
network.
Step 6. On receiving 〈IDmk,MG22,MG23,MG24, TSk〉,
the smartcard of Up chooses a timestamp TS∗p and checks
whether the condition |TS∗p − TSk| ≤ 4T is correct. If
it is incorrect, then the smartcard of Up aborts the session,
otherwise calculates MG25 = MG22 ⊕ (IDp ⊕ Rp) = Rmk,
MG26 = MG23 ⊕ MG25 = h(IDp ‖ Xk), SK∗Up,PSk =
h(IDp ‖ IDmk ‖ Rp ‖ MG25 ‖ MG26 ‖ TSk), MG27 =
h(SK∗Up,PSk ‖ MG22 ‖ MG23 ‖ Rp ‖ MG25 ‖ TSk). Now,
the smartcard of Up checks whether MG27 =?MG24 holds.
If MG27 6= MG24, then the smartcard of Up terminates the
session, otherwise, believes that PSk is authentic entity and
the common session session key is SK∗Up,PSk = SKUp,PSk .
III. SECURITY WEAKNESSES IN DAS ET AL.’S PROTOCOL
We will now reveal the insecurity of Das et al.’s protocol.
A. Loss of Patient Anonymity
As previously mentioned, the anonymity of a patient is
highly important [17]. Das et al.’s protocol claimed that the
patients are anonymous in their system. However, we will now
demonstrate how this property can be violated.
1) Loss of Anonymity using Smartcard Information: In this
method, we assume that a legitimate patient can act as a
malicious patient or adversary, who has the smartcard of a
legitimate patient, and thus can retrieve smartcard information
〈IDmj , Amj , Pmj , Ep, Fp, h(·), Gen(·), Rep(·), t〉 (e.g. using
the technique proposed in [30], [31]). As the malicious pa-
tient is legitimate, he/she can compute h(IDmj ‖ Xmj) as
(Pmj ⊕ PWRp) using his/her PWRp. Since the login in-
formation MG3 is transmitted through an unreliable network,
the malicious patient can intercept MG3. Now, the malicious
patient can find IDp as MG3 ⊕ h(IDmj ‖ Xmj). Thus, Das
et al.’s protocol does not ensure patient anonymity.
2) Loss of Anonymity using Login and Authentication Mes-
sages: Another legitimate patient may seek to leak medical
server information and become a malicious patient (e.g. reg-
istering with the server in order to exploit this vulnerability),
which we denote as A. In Das et al.’s protocol, the system’s
information MG11 is static and can easily be computed by the
legitimate patient as IDp⊕MG12. Note that it is not difficult
to make the information MG11 public. The malicious user
now can compute IDp as MG11 ⊕MG12 of any legitimate
patient only using the login and authentication messages,
which are transmitted over an insecure network. In other
words, anyone can break the anonymity assurance in Das et
al.’s protocol.
B. Loss of Traceability Attack
For a stronger sense of anonymity, traceability is always
regarded as an important property. Now, we demonstrate that
Das et al.’s protocol cannot ensure the traceability property.
We assume that the adversary A intercepts two succes-
sive login messages 〈IDmj , IDpk,MG3,MG4,MG5, TSp〉
and 〈ID′mj , ID′pk,MG′3,MG′4,MG′5, TS′p〉, where MG2 =
Pmj ⊕ RPW ∗p = h(IDmj ‖ Xmj), MG3 = IDp ⊕MG2.
Note that the computation of MG3 depends only on the
patient’s and server’s information. If (MG3 =?MG′3), then A
believes that the two login messages are from the same patient.
Thus, Das et al.’s protocol is not sure against traceability
attack.
C. New Smartcard Launch Attack
This is another common security feature typically required
of smartcards, where an adversary A attempts to issue new
smartcard by using a legitimate patient’s identity. In order to
launch this attack, the following operations are required to be
performed.
Step 1. In Section III-A2, we present the approach to find IDp
of Up. Therefore, A performs the same approach to know the
IDp of Up
Step 2. Now, A computes MG11 = h(IDmj ‖ Xmj) =
MG12 ⊕ IDp.
Step 3. A chooses a new password PWnp , biometric Bnp
and computes RPWnp = h(IDp ‖ Knp ‖ PWnp ), Anmj =
Amj ⊕ RPW ∗p ⊕ RPWnp , Pnmj = Pmj ⊕ RPW ∗p ⊕ RPWnp ,
Gen(Bnp ) = (σ
n
p , τ
n
p ), E
n
p = h(IDp ‖ σnp ) ⊕ Knp ,
Fnp = h(IDp ‖ RPWnp ‖ σnp ), where RPW ∗p can
be computed as discussed in Section III-A1. Finally, A
stores 〈IDmj , Anmj , Pnmj , Enp , Fnp , h(·), Gen(·), Rep(·), t〉 into
the new smartcard, where 1 ≤ j ≤ m+m′. Thus,A can launch
the above attack successfully.
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Fig. 1. Multi-medical system framework [17]
4IV. PROPOSED PROTOCOL
Fig. 1 outlines the medical system architecture proposed
in [17], which comprises medical registration server, medical
server, physician server and patients. The medical registration
server is mainly responsible for providing registration service
to all medical servers. In this architecture, there are several
medical servers located in different locations for providing
registration services to the physician servers and the patients.
Note that the physician servers may be under the control of any
medical server. In addition, it participates in the negotiation
of session key between a physician server and patient. The
patients may seek medical treatment from anywhere and
anytime. After performing the registration with a medical
server, the patient logins into the system to negotiate a session
key with a physician server. This session key will be used to
exchange some medical information of the patient.
Our proposed protocol consists of nine phase, namely:
setup, medical-server registration, physician-server registra-
tion, patient registration, login, authentication and session key
negotiation, new physician-server addition, password renewal,
and biometric renewal. Table I summarizes the notations used
in the protocol.
TABLE I
NOTATIONS
Symbol Description
MRS Central-medical-registration-server
Up Patient, (1 ≤ p ≤ m)
MSj Medical-server, (1 ≤ j ≤ n)
PSk Physician-server, (1 ≤ k ≤ l)
IDmj Identity of the MSj
IDpk Identity of the PSk
IDp Identity of the Up
TIDp Temporary unique identity of the Up
Bp Biometric of the Up
PW p Password of the Up
MKshrd Common key between all the MSj
SK Session key of the protocol
H(·) Bio-hashing function
h(·) Hash function {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}k
‖ Concatenation operation (a ‖ b)
⊕ Bitwise XOR operation (a⊕ b)
A. Setup Phase
MRS (medical registration server) selects a master key
MKshrd and shares it among all medical servers MSj (1 ≤
j ≤ n) securely. Note that, this key cannot be compromised
under any circumstances.
Medical server MSj Medical registration server MRS
Chooses an unique identity IDmj
〈IDmj〉−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
(via a secure channel)
Compute MSkeyj = h(IDmj ‖MSK)
Store 〈IDmj , EMSK(MSkeyj )〉 in the table
〈MSkeyj 〉←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
(via a secure channel)
Keep MSkeyj secret
Fig. 2. Medical server registration phase of our protocol.
B. Medical Server Registration Phase
Each medical server MSj (1 ≤ j ≤ n) needs to register
with MRS before accessing any service. MSj chooses an
unique identity IDmj and sends it to MRS via a secure
channel. On receiving IDmj , MRS calculates MSkeyj =
h(IDmj ‖ MSK) as a secret key of MSj and stores
〈IDmj , EMSK(MSkeyj )〉 in the table for all MSj (1 ≤ j ≤
n). Finally, MRS sends 〈MSkeyj 〉 to MSj via a secure
channel. Note that, MSj keeps MSkeyj secret and none can
obtain it by any means. Fig. 2 also describes this phase.
Physician server PSk Medical server MSj
Chooses an unique identity IDpk
〈IDpk〉−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
(via a secure channel)
Compute PSkeyk = h(IDpk ‖MSkeyj )
〈PSkeyk〉←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
(via a secure channel)
Keep PSkeyk secret
Fig. 3. Physician server registration phase of our protocol.
C. Physician Server Registration Phase
The main objective of this phase (see Fig. 3) is to negotiate
a session key between the patient Up and a physician server
PSk, which is managed by a doctor. Therefore, all physician
servers PSk (1 ≤ k ≤ l) must register with the home medical
server MSj . Specifically, PSk chooses a unique identity IDpk
and sends it to MSj via a secure channel. On getting IDpk,
MSj calculates PSkeyk = h(IDpk ‖ MSkeyj ) and sends to
PSk securely.
Patient Up Medical-server MSj
Chooses an unique identity IDp
〈IDp〉−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
(via a secure channel)
Generate a random number rp
Select an unique temporary identity TIDp
Compute Ap = h(IDp ‖ rp ‖MSkeyj )
Store 〈Ap, IDp, T IDp〉 in the smartcard
Keep secret 〈TIDp, EMSkeyj (IDp), rp〉
〈Smartcard〉←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
(via a secure channel)
Enter IDp, PWp and Bp into the smartcard
Compute Dp = H(Bp)
Compute Cp = Ap ⊕ h(PWp ‖ Dp)
Compute Ep = h(IDp ‖ PWp ‖ Dp)
Delete Ap from the smartcard
Store 〈Cp, Dp, Ep, IDp, T IDp, h(·), H(·)〉
Fig. 4. Patient registration phase of our protocol.
D. Patient Registration Phase
In this phase (see Fig. 4), a patient Up (1 ≤ p ≤ m) needs
to be registered with a nearby medical server MSj in order
to access physician servers located in different places.
Step 1. Up chooses a unique identity IDp and sends it to MSj
securely.
Step 2. MSj computes Ap = h(IDp ‖ rp ‖ MSkeyj )
and stores 〈Ap, IDp, T IDp〉 it in the memory of a smart-
card, where rp is the random number selected by MSj and
TIDp is the unique temporary identity for Up. Then, MSj
keeps a secret table, which includes a tuple of the form
5〈TIDp, EMSkeyj (IDp), rp〉 for each Up(1 ≤ p ≤ m). Finally,
MSj delivers the smartcard to the Up through an off-line
mode.
Step 3. On receiving the smartcard, Up enters his/her identity
IDp, password PWp, and biometric Bp into the smartcard.
Now, the smartcard calculates Dp = H(Bp), Cp = Ap ⊕
h(PWp ‖ Dp), and Ep = h(IDp ‖ PWp ‖ Dp), where H(·)
is the bio-hashing function [8].
Step 4. Up deletes Ap from the smartcard. Finally, the
smartcard holds 〈Cp, Dp, Ep, IDp, T IDp, h(·), H(·)〉. The
Patient Up Medical-server MSj
Insert the smartcard
Enter IDp, PWp, and Bp
Compute D∗p = H(Bp)
If D∗p 6= Dp, abort the connection
Else, compute E∗p = h(IDp ‖ PWp ‖ Dp)
If E∗p 6= Ep, abort the session
Else, select a random number Rl
Compute A∗p = Cp ⊕ h(PWp ‖ Dp)
Compute Kp = h(IDp ‖ IDj ‖ Rl ‖ A∗p ‖ Tl)
Compute M1 = h(IDj ‖ A∗p)⊕Rl
〈IDk,Kp,M1, T IDp, Tl〉−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
(via a insecure channel)
If |Tl − Ts| > 4T , abort the session
Else, extract 〈IDp, rp〉 using TIDp from the table
Compute A′p = h(IDp ‖ rp ‖MSkeyj )
Compute R′l = M1 ⊕ h(IDj ‖ A′p)
Compute K ′p = h(IDp ‖ IDj ‖ A′p ‖ Tl)
If K ′p = Kp, authenticate the Up
Else, abort the session
Fig. 5. Login and authentication phase of our protocol.
E. Login and Authentication Phase
This phase (Fig. 5) is invoked whenever a patient needs
to access medical data from a physician server. To complete
this phase, the smartcard generates login message on inputting
patient information and then forwards the message to MSj ,
where he/she has executed the registration phase.
Step 1. At the beginning, Up inserts the smartcard into the
terminal, and enters IDp, PWp, and Bp. Then, the smartcard
computes D∗p = H(Bp). If D
∗
p 6= Dp, then the smartcard of
Up aborts the session, otherwise calculates E∗p = h(IDp ‖
PWp ‖ Dp). If E∗p 6= Ep, then the smartcard of the Up aborts
the session, otherwise, executes further operations.
Step 2. The smartcard of Up selects a random number Rl,
and timestamp Tl. The smartcard of Up computes A∗p = Cp⊕
h(PWp ‖ Dp), Kp = h(IDp ‖ IDj ‖ Rl ‖ A∗p ‖ Tl), M1 =
h(IDj ‖ A∗p)⊕Rl.
Step 3. Now, the smartcard of Up provides a option to choose
the identity IDk of the physician server PSk, from which
the patient wishes to access the service. The smartcard then
sends 〈IDk,Kp,M1, T IDp, Tl〉 to MSj through an unreliable
network.
Step 4. Whenever MSj receives the login message
〈IDk,Kp,M1, T IDp, Tl〉, it checks whether |Tl − Ts| ≤ 4T
holds, where Ts is current timestamp. If it holds, then MSj
extracts 〈IDp, rp〉 from the table using TIDp and calculates
A′p = h(IDp ‖ rp ‖ MSkeyj ), R′l = M1 ⊕ h(IDj ‖ A′p),
K ′p = h(IDp ‖ IDj ‖ A′p ‖ Tl). If K ′p 6= Kp, then MSj
aborts the session, otherwise, authenticates the Up. The
F. Session Key Agreement Phase
This phase (Fig. 6 ) is used to execute the mutual authentica-
tion and session between the entities in the protocol execution.
Step 1. After the execution of the login phase, MSj receives
the login message with IDk as the parameter. In our protocol,
the execution of Cases 1 and 2 depends on the existence of
IDp. If IDk is present in the local database of MSj , then
Case 1 will be executed to allow the patient to negotiate a
session key between Up and PSk. Here, IDk is the identity
of PSk. On the other hand, if IDk is not found in the local
database, then MSj searches in the global database. If MSj
is found, then we have Case 2.
Case 1.
Step 1-1. MSj calculates PSkeyk = h(IDk ‖MSkeyj ), Lp =
h(IDk ‖ TIDp ‖ PSkeyk)⊕R′l, Np = h(TIDp ‖ PSkeyk)⊕
IDp, Op = h(IDp ‖ IDj ‖ IDk ‖ R′l ‖ Ts) and then sends
〈Lp, Np, Op, IDj , Ts, TIDp〉 to the PSk over an unreliable
network.
Step 1-2. On receiving 〈Lp, Np, Op, IDj , Ts, TIDp〉, PSk
first checks whether |Ts − Tk| ≤ 4T holds, where Tk is the
current timestamp. If the above verification fails, then PSk
terminates the connection, otherwise computes R′′l = Lp ⊕
h(IDk ‖ TIDp ‖ PSkeyk), ID′p = Np⊕h(TIDp ‖ PSkeyk),
and O′′p = h(ID
′
p ‖ IDj ‖ IDk ‖ R′′l ‖ Ts). If O′′p 6= Op,
then PSk aborts the connection, otherwise executes further
computations.
Step 1-3. PSk now selects a random number Rp, a session
key SK randomly, and then calculates Pp = h(IDp ‖ SK ‖
IDk ‖ Tk ‖ h(IDp ‖ PSkeyk)), Qp = R′′l ⊕ h(IDp ‖
PSkeyk), Sp = SK ⊕ h(IDp ‖ R′′l ‖ Tk). Finally, PSk sends
〈Pp, Qp, Sp, Tk〉 to Up via an unreliable network.
Step 1-4. Up first takes whether |Tt − Tk| ≤ 4T holds,
where Tt is the current timestamp. If the above condition
is correct, then Up extracts h(IDp ‖ PSkeyk) using Rl and
SK ′ and 〈IDp, Rl〉 from Qp and Sp, respectively. Now, Up
further calculates P ′p = h(IDp ‖ SK ′ ‖ IDk ‖ Tk ‖
h(IDp ‖ PSkeyk)). If P ′p = Pp, then Up authenticates the
PSk, otherwise terminates the session.
Step 1-5. In order to resist traceability attack, Up sends an
acknowledgment to MSj that the session is correctly executed.
On receiving the acknowledgment, MSj generates a random
unique identity TID′p 6= TIDp and computes M2 = TID′p⊕
Rl, M3 = h(IDp ‖ TID′p ‖ Rl), and sends 〈M2,M3〉 to Up
over an unreliable network.
Step 1-6. On receiving 〈M2,M3〉, Up extracts TID′p as
TID′p = M2 ⊕ Rl and M ′3 = h(IDp ‖ TID′p ‖ Rl). If
the condition M ′3 = M3 is correct, then the smartcard of Up
replaces TIDp with TID′p in the memory.
Case 2.
In this case, MSj extracts the identity IDmj of MSj , which is
managed by the the physician server PSk with identity IDpk.
MSj executes the following steps to negotiate a secure session
key between Uj and PSk.
Step 2-1. The home medical server MSj computes Y1 =
IDp ⊕ h(ID′mj ‖ T1 ‖ MKshrd) and Y2 = h(IDmj ‖
ID′mj ‖ MKshrd ‖ T1), where ID′mj is the identity
of the foreign medical server MSj . Finally, MSj sends
〈Y1, Y2, T1, IDmj〉 through an insecure network to MSj ,
which is under the control of PSk.
Step 2-2. On receiving 〈Y1, Y2, T1, IDj〉, MSj first checks
whether |T1 − T2| ≤ 4T holds. If the verification fails, then
6Medical server MSj Physician-server PSk Patient Up
MSj checks whether IDk is in the local database
If IDk is found, execute Case 1
Else, executes Case 2
Case 1:
Compute PSkeyk = h(IDpk ‖MSkeyj )
Compute Lp = h(IDpk ‖ TIDp ‖ PSkeyk)⊕R′l
Compute Np = h(TIDp ‖ PSkeyk)⊕ IDp
Compute Op = h(IDp ‖ IDmj ‖ IDpk ‖ R′l ‖ Ts)
〈Lp, Np, Op, IDmj , Ts, T IDp〉−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
(via an insecure channel)
If |Ts − Tk| > 4T , abort the session
Else, compute R′′l = Lp ⊕ h(IDk ‖ TIDp ‖ PSkeyk)
Compute ID′p = Np ⊕ h(TIDp ‖ PSkeyk)
Compute O′′p = h(ID
′
p ‖ IDmj ‖ IDpk ‖ R′′l ‖ Ts)
If O′′p 6= Op , abort the session
Else, generate a random number Rp and a session key SK
Compute Pp = h(IDp ‖ SK ‖ IDpk ‖ Tk ‖ h(IDp ‖ PSkeyk))
Compute Qp = R′′l ⊕ h(IDp ‖ PSkeyk)
Compute Sp = SK ⊕ h(IDp ‖ R′′l ‖ Tk)
〈Pp, Qp, Sp, Tk〉−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
(via an insecure channel)
If |Tt − Tk| > 4T , abort the session
Else, extract h(IDp ‖ PSkeyk) using Rl
Extract SK ′ using 〈IDp, Rl〉
Compute P ′p = h(IDp ‖ SK ′ ‖ IDpk ‖ Tk ‖ h(IDp ‖ PSkeyk))
If P ′p 6= Pp, abort the session
Else, accept PSk
〈Acknowledgement〉←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
(via an insecure channel)
Generate TID′p 6= TIDp
Compute M2 = TID′p ⊕Rl
Compute M3 = h(IDp ‖ TID′p ‖ Rl)
〈M2,M3〉−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
(via an insecure channel)
Compute TID′p = M2 ⊕Rl
Compute M ′3 = h(IDp ‖ TID′p ‖ Rl)
If M ′3 6= M3, abort the session
Else, replace TIDp with TID′p in the smartcard
Fig. 6. Session key agreement phase of our protocol (Case 1).
Home medical server MSj Foreign medical server MSj Physician server PSk Patient Up
Assume that IDpk is found in the global database
Compute Y1 = IDp ⊕ h(ID′mj ‖ T1 ‖MKshrd)
Compute Y2 = h(IDmj ‖ ID′mj ‖MKshrd ‖ T1)
〈Y1, Y2, T1, IDmj〉−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
(via a insecure channel)
If |T1 − T2| > 4T , aborts the session
Else, compute Y ′2 = h(IDmj ‖ ID′mj ‖MKshrd ‖ T1)
If Y ′2 6= Y2, aborts the session
Else, extract IDp = Y1 ⊕ h(ID′mj ‖ T1 ‖MKshrd)
Compute Y3 = h(IDpk ‖ IDp ‖ T1 ‖ PSkeyj )
Compute Y4 = IDp ⊕ h(IDpk ‖ PSkeyj ‖ T1)
〈Y3, Y4, T2〉−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
(via a insecure channel)
If |T2 − T3| > 4T aborts the session
Else, generate a random session key SK
Compute ID′p = Y4 ⊕ h(IDpk ‖ PSkeyj ‖ T1)
Compute Y ′3 = h(IDpk ‖ ID′p ‖ T1 ‖ PSkeyj )
If (Y ′3 6= Y3), abort the session
Compute Y5 = ID′p ⊕ SK
Compute Y6 = h(ID′p ‖ SK ‖ IDpk ‖ T3)
〈Y5, y6, T3〉−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
(via a insecure channel)
If |T3 − T4| > 4T , aborts the session
Else, compute Y ′6 = h(IDp ‖ SK ‖ IDpk ‖ T3)
If Y ′6 6= Y6, the Up abort the session
〈Acknowledgement〉←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
(via a insecure channel)
Receives acknowledgment
Generates TID′p where TID
′
p 6= TIDp
Computes M22 = TID′p ⊕Rl
Computes M33 = h(IDp ‖ TID′p ‖ Rl)
〈M22,M33〉−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
(via a insecure channel)
Receives messages from MSj
Computes TID′p = M22 ⊕Rl
Computes M ′33 = h(IDp ‖ TID′p ‖ Rl)
If |M ′33 6= M33|, aborts the session
replaces TIDp with TID′p in the smartcard
Fig. 7. Session key agreement phase of our protocol (Case 2).
MSj aborts the session, otherwise, computes Y ′2 = h(IDmj ‖
ID′mj ‖ MKshrd ‖ T1). If (Y ′2 6= Y2), then MSj aborts
the connection, otherwise extracts IDp = Y1 ⊕ h(ID′mj ‖
T1 ‖ MKshrd), and computes Y3 = h(IDpk ‖ IDp ‖ T1 ‖
7PSkeyj ), Y4 = IDp ⊕ h(IDpk ‖ PSkeyj ‖ T1). MSj sends
〈Y3, Y4, T2〉 to the PSk through an insecure network.
Step 2-3. On receiving 〈Y3, Y4, T2〉, PSk first checks whether
|T2 − T3| ≤ 4T holds, where T3 is the current timestamp. If
the timestamp verification fails, then PSk aborts the session,
otherwise, generates a random session key SK and computes
ID′p = Y4 ⊕ h(IDpk ‖ PSkeyj ‖ T1), Y ′3 = h(IDk ‖ ID′p ‖
T1 ‖ PSkeyj ). If Y ′3 6= Y3, then PSk aborts the connection,
otherwise, computes Y5 = ID′p ⊕ SK, Y6 = h(ID′p ‖ SK ‖
IDpk ‖ T3) and sends 〈Y5, Y6, T3〉 to Up through an insecure
network.
Step 2-4. Up checks whether |T3 − T4| ≤ 4T holds, where
T4 is the current timestamp. If the timestamp verification
fails, then Up aborts the session, otherwise, computes Y ′6 =
h(IDp ‖ SK ‖ IDpk ‖ T3). If Y ′6 6= Y6, then Up aborts
the connection, otherwise, sends an acknowledgment to the
home medical server MSj to confirm that the session key is
negotiated with the correct PSk.
Step 2-5. On receiving the acknowledgment, MSj generates
a new random unique identity TID′p 6= TIDp and computes
M22 = TID
′
p ⊕Rl, M33 = h(IDp ‖ TID′p ‖ Rl), and sends
〈M22,M33〉 to Up over an unreliable network.
Step 2-6. On receiving 〈M22,M33〉, Up extracts TID′p as
TID′p = M22 ⊕ Rl and M ′33 = h(IDp ‖ TID′p ‖ Rl). If
the condition M ′33 = M33 is correct, then the smartcard of
the Up replaces TIDp with TID′p in the memory.
Fig. 7 also outlines this phase.
G. New Physician Server Addition Phase
It is also necessary to add new physician server(s) to the
system for scalability and achieve higher system reliability.
Thus, our protocol supports the addition of new physician
server. The new physician server PSt first chooses a unique
identity IDpt and then sends it to MSj securely. Then, MSj
performs PSkeyt = h(IDpt ‖ MSkeyj ) and sends it to
PSt through a secure network. Accordingly, our protocol can
increase the flexibility of the system by adding new physician
server.
H. Password Update Phase
The password PWp of patient Up can be updated (periodi-
cally).
Step 1. Up inserts the smartcard to the terminal and enters
IDp, PWp, and Bp. Then, the smartcard computes D∗p =
H(Bp). If D∗p 6= Dp, then the smartcard aborts the session,
otherwise, computes E∗p = h(IDp ‖ PWp ‖ Dp). If E∗p 6= Ep,
then the smartcard aborts the session, otherwise requests to
enter a new password.
Step 2. Suppose that Up inputs a new password PWnewp . The
smartcard now performs Ap = Cp ⊕ h(PWp ‖ Dp), Cnewp =
Ap ⊕ h(PWnewp ‖ Dp), Enewp = h(IDp ‖ PWnewp ‖ Dp)
and finally includes 〈Cnewp , Enewp 〉 into the memory and drops
〈Cp, Ep〉.
I. Biometric Renewal Phase
This phase updates the biometric information of the regis-
tered patient. First, executes Step 1 in Section IV-H to verify
the correctness of IDp, PWp, and Bp. If all of these are
correct, then the smartcard requests to enter new biometric in-
formation. Suppose that Up enters Bnewp as the new biometric
information. Now the smartcard computes Dnewp = H(B
new
p ),
Cnewp = Ap ⊕ h(PWp ‖ Dnewp ), and Enewp = h(IDp ‖
PWnewp ‖ Dnewp ) and includes 〈Dnewp , Cnewp , Enewp 〉 by
replacing the old information 〈Dp, Cp, Ep〉.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
This section evaluates the security of the proposed protocol.
A. Capabilities of the Adversary
In this section, we analyze that whether an adversary can
launch attacks or not based on our protocol information under
the assumption mentioned in [21]. At first, our objective
is to examine whether the adversary could calculate private
information or not from the public information. The following
cases will demonstrate the above objectives.
• Case 1: We assume that an adversaryA can get the smart-
card of the Up and easily extract confidential information
to break the security of the proposed protocol by using
the processes described in [30], [31]. In our protocol, the
smartcard includes 〈Cp, Dp, Ep, IDj , T IDp, h(·), H(·)〉,
where Dp = H(Bp), Cp = Ap ⊕ h(PWp ‖ Dp), and
Ep = h(IDp ‖ PWp ‖ Dp), Ap = h(IDp ‖ rp ‖
MSkeyj ). The objective of the A is to calculate the
private information 〈IDp, PWp, Ap〉 using the informa-
tion obtained from the smartcard. Though A knows Dp,
it is infeasible to calculate IDp, PWp from the known
information Ep owing to the difficulties of the inversion
of the hash function h(·). In the similar fashion, the A
is not able to find Ap from Cp. Therefore, our proposed
system is still secure even if the smartcard of the Up is
available to the A.
• Case 2. In our protocol, the smartcard sends a lo-
gin information 〈IDpk,Kp,M1, T IDp, Tl〉 to the MSj
through a public network. If A monitors the network,
he/she can easily intercept all these information, where
A∗p = Cp ⊕ h(PWp ‖ Dp), Kp = h(IDp ‖ IDmj ‖ Rl ‖
A∗p ‖ Tl), M1 = h(IDmj ‖ A∗p) ⊕ Rl. In this case, the
confidential information are 〈Ap, IDp, PWp, Rl〉. In our
protocol, we use a one-way hash function h(·) to compute
Kp and M1. All the information 〈Ap, IDp, PWp, Rl〉 are
protected due to the h(·), and therefore the A cannot find
these confidential information. Thus, if the A obtains
the message 〈IDk,Kp,M1, T IDp, Tl〉 from the public
network, he/she cannot break the security of the proposed
system.
• Case 3. In our protocol, the MSj sends the message
〈Lp, Np, Op, IDmj , Ts, T IDp〉 to the PSk through an
unreliable network. Therefore, the A can capture all
these information, where PSkeyk = h(IDpk ‖MSkeyj ),
Lp = h(IDpk ‖ TIDp ‖ PSkeyk) ⊕ R′l, Np =
h(TIDp ‖ PSkeyk) ⊕ IDp, Op = h(IDp ‖ IDmj ‖
IDpk ‖ R′l ‖ Ts). The objective of A is to find
〈PSkeyk , Rl, IDp〉. Though the A knows IDpk, how-
ever, he/she is not able to compute PSkeyk due to the
8unknown information MSkeyj . On the other hand, the
A cannot compute Rl using Lp due to the unknown
information PSkeyk . In the same way, the A cannot find
the information IDp. Therefore, the A could not get any
confidential information even if he/she has the message
〈Lp, Np, Op, IDj , Ts, T IDp〉.
• Case 4. Similar to Case 3, the A attempts to find
private information used in the protocol using the public
messages 〈Pp, Qp, Sp, Tk〉 and 〈M2,M3〉, where Pp =
h(IDp ‖ SK ‖ IDpk ‖ Tk ‖ h(IDp ‖ PSkeyk)),
Qp = R
′′
l ⊕ h(IDp ‖ PSkeyk), Sp = SK ⊕
h(IDp ‖ R′′l ‖ Tk) and M2 = TID′p ⊕ Rl, M3 =
h(IDp ‖ TID′p ‖ rl). The objective of the A is
to find the private information 〈IDp, SK, PSkeyk , Rl〉
from 〈Pp, Qp, Sp, Tk〉 and 〈M2,M3〉. Since all the public
information are protected by the hash function h(·), it is
extremely difficult to extract the confidential information
〈IDp, SK, PSkeyk , Rl〉. Therefore, our protocol is secure
even if the messages 〈Pp, Qp, Sp, Tk〉 and 〈M2,M3〉 are
known to the A
• Case 5. We suppose that the A captures the messages
〈Y1, Y2, T1, IDmj〉 and 〈Y3, Y4, T2〉, where Y1 = IDp ⊕
h(ID′mj ‖ T1 ‖ MKshrd) and Y2 = h(IDmj ‖ ID′mj ‖
MKshrd ‖ T1) and Y3 = h(IDpk ‖ IDp ‖ T1 ‖
PSkeyj ), Y4 = IDp ⊕ h(IDpk ‖ PSkeyj ‖ T1). All
the private information IDp, MKshrd, and PSkeyj are
protected by the h(·). Therefore, our protocol is secured
even if the messages 〈Y1, Y2, T1, IDmj〉 and 〈Y3, Y4, T2〉
are known to the A.
• Case 6. We suppose that the A captures the message
〈Y5, Y6, T3〉, where ID′p = Y4⊕h(IDpk ‖ PSkeyj ‖ T1),
Y ′3 = h(IDpk ‖ ID′p ‖ T1 ‖ PSkeyj ). All the parameters
of 〈Y5, Y6, T3〉 are protected due to the hardness of h(·),
so it is infeasible by the A to compute all the private
information 〈SK,PSkeyj , IDp〉.
B. Discussion on Security Attacks of Our Protocol
In this section, we show that our proposed protocol is
secure against all the known security threats. For the Case
1, we have demonstrated that the adversary could not get
any advantage even if obtain all the information stored in the
smartcard. Therefore, our protocol is secure against smartcard
stolen attack. Moreover, the adversary cannot guess patient’s
secret information (low-entropy)such as identity, password,
and biometric from the smartcard information. Therefore, the
protocol is protected against the off-line password guessing
attack.
We have also noticed in all the situations described in Case
1 to Case 6 that the adversary is unable to retrieve patient’s
identity IDp. Hence, the anonymity of the patient is strongly
achieved in our protocol.
In the patient registration phase, the patient only sends
his/her IDp to the medical-registration server MSj . No in-
formation related to the password PWp is sent to the MSj ,
and further, the server cannot obtain PWp from the known
information. Hence, our protocol is free from insider attack.
According to [17], the protocol may suffer from imperson-
ation attack provided the adversary can extract some useful
private information from the transmitted public messages.
We have described Case 1 to Case 6 that the adversary
cannot find the private information from the public messages.
Therefore, our protocol is robust against patient impersonation
attack, medical-server impersonation attack and physician-
server impersonation attack.
In our protocol, we have used a random number SK
as a session key, which is negotiated between the entities
involved in the protocol. According to our analysis (see the
Section V-A), the parameter SK is strongly protected. Hence,
our protocol is free from session key security attack. Since
we have utilized the concept of the timestamp in our protocol
and each entity check the timestamp, so the adversary cannot
launch the replay attack.
In the login phase of our protocol, the smartcard of the
patient Up first verifies the patient’s biometric template and
further verifies the identity and password. Afterwards, the
smartcard sends the login message to the MSj . Therefore,
the unauthorized patient cannot generate a valid login message
without. Moreover, an authorized patient cannot also login to
the medical-server using wrong login credentials. Therefore, if
the patient inputs wrong login credentials, the smartcard will
detect and notify the patient. This kind of verification reduces
communication and computation cost. Hence, our protocol
is efficient. On the other hand, each entity performs some
operations after verifying the received message from other
entity. Therefore, the mutual authentication between all the
entities is also satisfied in our protocol.
C. Protocol Simulation using AVISPA Software
In this section, we will present the protocol simulation
protocol using AVISPA (see [22] for more information about
the tool). We omit the inclusion of the HLPSL code for
AVISPA, and only present the simulation findings for both
OFMC and Cl-AtSe models (see Fig. 8). The findings show
that our protocol is SAFE, which implies that the protocol is
secure against active and passive attacks, replay attacks and
man-in-the-middle attacks.
SUMMARY 
SAFE 
DETAILS 
BOUNDED_NUMBER_OF_SESSIONS 
PROTOCOL 
/home/avispa/web-interfacecomputation/./ 
tempdir/workfileT6hy8b.if 
GOAL 
as_specified 
BACKEND 
OFMC 
COMMENTS 
STATISTICS 
parseTime: 0.00s 
searchTime: 0.24s 
visitedNodes: 27 nodes 
depth: 6 plies 
SUMMARY 
SAFE 
DETAILS 
BOUNDED_NUMBER_OF_SESSIONS 
TYPED_MODEL 
PROTOCOL 
/home/avispa/web-interfacecomputation/./ 
tempdir/workfileGqYqkK.if 
GOAL 
As Specified 
BACKEND 
CL-AtSe 
STATISTICS 
Analysed : 2488 states 
Reachable : 137 states 
Translation: 0.67 seconds 
Computation: 0.03 seconds 
(a) OFMC Results                                                      (b) CL-AtSe Results 
Fig. 8. Simulation results in OFMC and CL-AtSe backends
D. Protocol Simulation using Scyther Software
There are a number of protocol verification and simulation
tools, such as ProVerif [10] used to ensure protocol correct-
ness, AVISPA [11] to find potential protocol vulnerabilities,
9and Scyther [12], [13]. The latter is an automated tool, which
uses pattern refinement to identify instances of falsification.
Some key features of Scyther include:
• support for multi-protocol analysis;
• possibility of unbounded verification with guaranteed
termination; and
• analysis of infinite sets of traces in terms of patterns.
Scyther takes as input a protocol description that includes
a specification of the intended security properties (also known
as security claims) for evaluation. The result window shows
a summary of the claims in the protocol and the verification
results. Here, one can find whether the protocol is correct or
false. The tool has been successfully applied in studies such
as those of [15], [16].
Figures 9 and 10 present the outputs from the security
analysis of the proposed protocol using Scyther.
Fig. 9. Security analysis using Scyther for Case 1
Fig. 10. Security analysis using Scyther for Case 2
VI. PERFORMANCE STUDY
This section discusses the performance of the proposed
protocol with related protocols in terms of different security
attacks, computation cost, communication cost, and smartcard
storage cost. We compare our protocol with Amin and Biswas
[17], Das et al. [18], Maitra et al. [24], Li et al. [25],
and Wang and Ma [26] as these protocols use the similar
architecture and execute similar operations operations. Several
phases are involved in these protocol, but we did not consider
the patient registration phase and medical-server registration
phase because these phases are executed only one time. In
addition to that, the use of password change phase depends on
user choice and thus it is also excluded from the comparison.
Note that user anonymity is one of the the most important
security attributes, especially to design a secure and robust
TMIS system. Besides, protecting user traceability is also
equally important. In Das et al.’s protocol [18], they describe
that Amin and Biswas [17] protocol is not secure for the
several reasons such as insider attack, replay and man-in-
the-middle attacks, and design flaws in the registration, login
and authentication phases. In this paper, we demonstrate that
Das et al.’s protocol does not preserve user anonymity and
traceability property. In addition, the same protocol is also
vulnerable to smartcard launch attack. Therefore, Das et al.’s
protocol is not completely secure, it is not applicable for real-
life applications. We then design an authentication protocol
and its security analysis claim that the protocol is completely
secure including anonymity and traceability under the hardness
assumption of the hash function.
TABLE II
COMPUTATION COST COMPARISON
Protocol CL CA CP TC
Amin and Biswas [17] 5Th 14Th 6Th 0.0100
Das et al. [18] 5Th 15Th 8Th 0.0110
Maitra et al. [24] 4Th + Te + Ts 6Th + Ts 6Th 2.0900
Li et al. [25] 2Th 25Th 7Th 0.0130
Wang and Ma [26] 4Th + 2Ts 7Th + 4Ts 4Th + 2Ts 1.0500
Proposed 5Th (16Th 11Th) 5Th 0.0084
CL: Computation cost for login phase, CA: Computation cost for authentication phase,
CP: Computation cost for password change phase, TC: Total execution cost (ms)
[17] [18] [24] [25] [26] Proposed
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Fig. 11. Total execution cost of different protocols
Now, we evaluate the computation cost of our proposed pro-
tocol and existing protocols [17], [18], [24], [25], [26]. Table II
and presents the login, authentication, and password change
phases. The earlier authentication protocols are vulnerable to
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different attacks. We found from Table II that our protocol
takes almost same computation cost in comparison with earlier
protocols. Note that our protocol protects all possible security
threats by executing the almost same number of hash operation
(Th). It is also noted that our protocol additionally achieves
user traceability and anonymity.
We use the experimental results of [23], where the SHA-
1 hash function has been executed using MIRACL C/C++
Library. The system uses 32-bit Windows 7 OS, Visual C++
2008 S/W. According to [23], the SHA-1 hash function takes
Th ≈ 0.0004 milliseconds, AES symmetric encryption takes
Ts ≈ 0.1303 milliseconds and the exponentiation operation
takes Te ≈ 1.8269 milliseconds. We have also used others
Ref. [32], [33], [34] for runtime verification. From Fig. 12
and Table II, it is clear that the protocols in [24], [26] need
huge time whereas ours and [18], [25] require very less time.
TABLE III
SMARTCARD STORAGE COST AND COMMUNICATION COST
Protocol SC (bit) LC (bit) AC (bit)
Amin and Biswas [17] 384 + (3× 128× n) 768 1152
Das et al. [18] 768 + (3× 128× n) 480 1098
Maitra et al. [24] 512 + (2× 128× n) 512 384
Li et al. [25] 768 512 1664
Wang and Ma [26] 384 320 256
Proposed 896 640 (1536 1280)
SC: Smartcard storage cost, LC: Communication cost for login phase, AC: Commu-
nication cost for authentication phase, CL: Computation cost for login phase, CA:
Computation cost for authentication phase, CP: Computation cost for password change
phase, n: Total number of medical-servers
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Fig. 12. Smartcard storage cost of different protocols
We evaluate the smartcard storage cost and communication
cost of our protocol including previous works in Table III.
The storage area in a smartcard is very limited. We found in
Table III that the smartcard storage cost in the protocols [17],
[18], [24] varies linearly with the number of medical-servers
(n) whereas our protocol, Li et al.’s protocol [25] and, Wang
and Ma [26] are independent of n. Because, the architecture of
their protocol is different. They have only considered multiple
number of servers, whereas the protocols in [17], [18], [24] and
[17] [18] [24] [25] [26] Proposed
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Fig. 13. Communication cost of login and authentication phases of different
protocols
ours considered multi-medical systems with multiple number
of medical-servers. The major contribution of our protocol is
that it is independent of n though it is based on the multiple
medical-servers. The pictorial representation of the smartcard
storage cost of different protocols including ours are presented
in Fig. 12, which shows that our protocol is very efficient
compared to the protocols in [17], [18], [24], [25]. In Fig. 13,
we also present the communication cost (bit) for login and
authentication phases of our protocol and the protocols in [17],
[18], [24], [25], [26]. Our protocol is very efficient in terms of
communication cost compared to the protocols in [17], [18],
[24], [26]. In order to resist the user traceability attack, our
protocol incurs additional one communication round. Hence,
our protocol takes slightly more communication cost than the
existing protocols.
VII. CONCLUSION
Designing secure cryptographic protocols remains challeng-
ing, as demonstrated in this paper (i.e. revealing insecurities
in Das et al.’s protocol). More importantly, we proposed an
efficient and reliable user authentication protocol for the TMIS
environment. Findings from the security and performance eval-
uations revealed that our protocol is secure against common
security threats and provides both user anonymity and user
untraceability, as well as being efficient in comparison to
related protocols.
Future research includes collaborating with a real-world
healthcare organization to implement a prototype of the pro-
posed protocol within a division or department. This will allow
us to evaluate its security and performance in a real-world
setting, and revise its design if necessary.
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